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editing and tampering the game save files. We also look how code obfuscation can
be used to protect against cheaters. Second, we study different type of server-side
architectures that be used to prevent cheating in the game. Finally, we present
our architecture that is especially designed to be used in mobile games. The
architecture takes account the limitations and restrictions of the mobile devices
like unreliable mobile networks and limited battery life.
Our analysis concludes that the server-side protection methods are clearly more
reliable to prevent cheating in games and they are also much harder to bypass
or break. Many of the client-side cheat protection methods are relying on the
secure through obscurity which means that they are vulnerable for flaws in the
implementation. Also, on the client-side the cheaters can easily gain an access to
the game’s memory, network traffic and files saved on the device storage. Using
server-side protection methods where the game logic is run fully or partially on
the server provides the most effective protection against cheaters.
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Huijaaminen videopeleissa¨ on aina ollut ongelma seka¨ pelaajille etta¨ kehitta¨jille.
Ongelma ei vain rajoitu avoimiin alustoihin kuten tietokonepeleihin vaan se
ulottuu myo¨s konsoli- ja mobiilipeleihin. Ta¨ssa¨ diplomityo¨ssa¨ tutkimme ylei-
sesti ka¨ytettyja¨ huijauksenesto menetelmia¨, joilla voidaan puolustautua erilaisia
huijaustyo¨kaluja vastaan. Keskitymme erityisesti menetelmiin, jotka ovat myo¨s
ka¨ytetta¨vissa¨ mobiilialustoilla.
Ensimma¨iseksi tutkimme miten asiakaspuolen puolustusmenetelmia¨, jotka voi-
daan suoraan toteuttaa pelin asiakassovellukseen. Na¨ma¨ menetelma¨t sisa¨lta¨va¨t
suojautumisen muistimuutoksilta ja tallennustietojen peukaloinnilta. Tutustum-
me myo¨s miten koodin obfuskointia voidaan ka¨ytta¨a¨ puolustautuakseen huijauk-
silta. Seuraavaksi tutkimme eri tyyppisia¨ palvelinpuolen arkkitehtuureja, joiden
avulla voidaan esta¨a¨ huijaaminen pelissa¨. Lopuksi esita¨mme itsesuunnitellun ark-
kitehtuurin, joka erityisesti suunnattu mobiilipeleille. Esitetty arkkitehtuuri ottaa
huomioon mobiililaitteiden useat eri rajoitukset, kuten epa¨luotettavat yhteydet
ja akkujen lyhyen kestoia¨n.
Analyysimme osoittaa, etta¨ palvelinpuolen suojautumismenetelma¨t ovat huomat-
tavasti luotettavampia esta¨ma¨a¨n huijaaminen peleissa¨ ja ne ovat myo¨s paljon
vaikeampi ohittaa tai rikkoa. Monet asiakaspuolen huijauksen suojautumismene-
telma¨t luottavat epa¨ma¨a¨ra¨isyyden tuottamaan turvallisuuteen, minka¨ takia ne
ovat haavoittuvia, jos toteutuksessa on puutteita. Lisa¨ksi asiakaspuolella huija-
rit pa¨a¨seva¨t helposti ka¨siksi pelin muistiin, verkkoliikenteeseen ja laitteelle tal-
lennettuihin tiedostoihin. Ka¨ytta¨ma¨lla¨ palvelinpuolen suojausmenetelmia¨, joissa
pelin logiikka ajetaan kokonaan tai osaksi palvelimella, tarjoaa tehokkaimman
suojauksen huijareita vastaan.
Asiasanat: huijaaminen, mobiilipelit, salaus, muistin muokkaus, koodin
ha¨ma¨rta¨minen, server-client, server autoratiivinen, client au-
toratiivinen
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cheating is nothing new. There are writings from ancient Olympics where
contestants would sabotage their opponent’s equipment before the race in or-
der to increase their chances to win. Sports, gambling and computer games
are one of the most common activities where cheating may occur. This the-
sis presents different approaches how to prevent cheating in mobile games.
Furthermore, this thesis evaluates each approach and their suitability in dif-
ferent scenarios. The purpose of analysing the scenarios is to answer what
type of mobile games each approach would be optimal. Finally, this thesis
introduces an combined approach on how to tackle the problem of cheat-
ing in mobile games using the lessons learned from the previously presented
approaches. The resulting approach aims to provide both protection and
flexibility without adding unnecessary design complexity or sacrificing game
performance.
1.1 Research background and motivation
Cheating can be defined as: to behave in a dishonest way in order to get
what you want [25]. For example, in tennis a player might use rackets of
illegal string tension to gain advance. In video games a player might use
a cheat where he gets more virtual currency. This can give the player un-
favourable advance against other players and may break the gameplay. In
online games where currency can be exchanged for other goods and items
can be bought using virtual currency it could even break the economy of the
game. This would affect all players and it would also hurt monetization if the
gold is intended to be purchased using real money. This can be disastrous
for the developer of the game if their source of income is only from in-game
purchases.
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There are many different ways how cheats can be applied in video games.
They can be as simple as text editors which are used to modify installed
game files or save game saves stored on the disk. They can also be more
complex third-party applications. For example, they can modify runtime
game data by injecting malicious code to game’s executable code. This is
achieved by editing memory used by the game’s process or manipulating the
game’s network traffic.
Mobile games are not an exception in terms of cheating. The tools and
intentions are the same. What makes it different is the free-to-play nature of
modern mobile games and the massive player audience. The most popular
mobile games are usually highly competitive and they can have hundreds
of millions of players. These differences to traditional games make mobile
games easy and desired targets for cheating. Finding and handling cheaters
among the millions of players can be hard and tedious. Punishing cheaters
can be difficult because the barrier to start a new game is very low due to
the free price of the game.
Developers need to have tools and techniques to prevent cheating in their
games. These tools and techniques can be software design patterns or algo-
rithms that are used to protect the game data from exploits or smart ways
of detecting players that are cheating. It is difficult to find research papers
that would give an good overview of the tools and the techniques to prevent
cheating in games. The closest one is an article written by Pritchard [26]
which covers different ways that players are able to cheat at various online
games and he also provides ways to prevent some of the cheats. Cano [7] has
written a book about how to hack games using different techniques but he
does not present any techniques to prevent them. Also, Hoglund et al. [17]
presents different ways to break online game security in their book. There are
also various books about software hacking and exploits that can be applied
to cheating in games [8, 16, 20, 38]. Our plan is to provide a broad overview
of the different tools and techniques used to prevent cheating. The majority
of the existing research does not take into account the unique requirements
of the mobile games and the limited resources of the mobile devices. In this
thesis we will gather and study different software design patterns and algo-
rithms from various research papers that can be used to either prevent or
detect cheating in games. Finally, we present our own approach to prevent
cheating in modern mobile games.
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1.2 Problem statement
Cheating in mobile games can give a considerable advantage for cheaters
and destroy user experience for other players. Developers might notice this
as bad reviews and low revenue. Thus, in order to develop a successful
modern mobile game the problem of cheating must be resolved. The problem
can be divided in two parts: detection and prevention. The objective of
this thesis is to study and evaluate different approaches that can be used
to either prevent cheating or detect cheaters from the point of view of a
mobile game developer. We pay special attention to the limited resources of
mobile devices. The investigated approaches include solutions that can be
software design patterns or algorithms that can be used in specific parts of
the game design. They can be large architectural software designs or describe
how a single operation in the game should be implemented. Suitability for
mobile games is evaluated in terms of usefulness, complexity and latency.
Furthermore, this thesis aims to design and present an suitable approach for
modern mobile games on the basis of the studied approaches.
1.3 Research approach
This thesis studies both proactive and defensive techniques. Proactive tech-
niques are used before cheating actually occurs thus they prevent cheating.
Defensive techniques are responding to cheating after it has occurred thus
they are used to detect cheating. In addition, the presented approaches can
be implemented either client-side, server-side or both. These observations
are used to categorize the approaches so that they can be presented in a
sensible manner.
The research is divided into two parts. First, we start from the client-side
approaches where we present both proactive and defensive techniques that
are performed on the client device. Second, we present proactive server-side
approaches which are designed to provide a reliable way to prevent cheating
by handling gameplay on a remote server. Each approach is studied and
evaluated using the available literature. Evaluation is based on usefulness,
complexity and latency.
Finally, we put theory into practice and present a solution for modern
mobile game development where we try to combine the best parts of the
previously presented approaches. We aim to both design and implement a
working approach that guarantees protection from cheating while focusing on
being easy to implement while providing good performance and low network
latency suitable for mobile devices.
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1.4 Outline
• Chapter 2 Client-side cheat detection and prevention presents var-
ious client-side techniques that can be used to detect and prevent cheat-
ing on the client device.
• Chapter 3 Server-side cheat detection and prevention discusses how
secure communication between the client and the server can prevent
cheating and presents an overview of the client-server architectures and
how they can be used to protect against cheating.
• Chapter 4 Client-server architecture for mobile games describes a
solution for a modern mobile game which tries to combine the best parts
of the previously presented approaches.
• Chapter 5 Conclusion and future work discusses about the results of
our analysis of the cheat protection techniques and potential future
research work.
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Chapter 2
Client-side cheat detection and
prevention
In this chapter we study how different client-side cheat protection techniques
can be used to detect and prevent cheating in games. These techniques can be
implemented in a way that they can be performed on the client device. This
is really important especially for the single player games because otherwise
they would be completely vulnerable for cheating. There a lot of different
ways to cheat in the games and the client-side cheat protection techniques
are the first line of the defence to protect against cheating.
In the chapter 2.1 we first study how encryption can be used to protect
the game files from tampering. Next, in the chapter 2.2 we explore different
memory editing tools and how they are used to cheat in games. In the
chapter 2.3 we investigate how to detect players that are using time cheats
to progress faster in the game. Last, in the chapter 2.4 we study different
techniques that can be used to prevent the cheaters from reverse engineering
the game.
2.1 Protecting game files
2.1.1 Introduction
Many games are using save files that are stored locally on the device. The
game stores the progress of the game to these files, so that the player can
continue playing the game without losing any progress when they return
back to the game. Often games are using popular data serialization formats
like JSON or XML to store the game state. Both formats store the data
as human-readable text which means that the cheaters can easily figure out
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the save format and modify the stored values using text editors. If the game
saves the amounts of the items inside the player’s inventory the cheater could
easily find the saved item amounts in the save data and modify them to be
larger. If the save data is serialized as non-readable binary data, the cheaters
can edit the save files because there are available many tools that can be used
to examine the binary data. The data files of the game are also vulnerable
for modifications. Usually the data files contain information about the game
rules like the item properties and the shop prices. The cheater could change
the shop prices to be lower or tweak to properties of the item in order to make
them stronger. In order to prevent the cheaters from modifying the save and
the data files they can be protected using checksum validation or encryption.
In the next section we look how encryption can be used to protect the files
from tampering.
2.1.2 Encrypting save and data files
The best way to protect the save and the data files is to encrypt the content
of the file. Encryption is a process where the data is encoded so that only
authorized parties can access it. The data is encoded using an encryption
algorithm that is also known as a cipher. The encryption algorithm generates
a ciphertext from the plaintext data which can be read only if it is decrypted
[30]. Many cryptographic algorithms that are used to encrypt and decrypt
data are using symmetric-key algorithms where the same cryptographic key
is used for both encrypting and decrypting the data.
It is very important to pick a strong cryptographic algorithm; otherwise
the attacker could crack the cipher using a brute force attack. The crypto-
graphic key size can be used to determine if the cryptographic algorithm is
considered weak. For example, National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) recommends that the Federal governments to use keys that
provide at least 112 bits of security strength for the key agreement [3]. The
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric cipher that uses key
sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits [37]. The AES provides a very strong security
and it is used by many applications. The AES cipher requires a unique bi-
nary sequence that is often called an initialization vector and a secret key.
The initialization vector can be randomly generated for each encryption op-
eration and it doesn’t need to be kept secret. In the appendix A we present
how the AES cipher can be used to encrypt and decrypt a string value in
C# programming language. The AES cipher is a very good choice for en-
crypting the game files. The secret key should be generated for the save files
so that the same save file can’t be used by other players. Only the player
that created the save file should be able to decrypt the save file. This will
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prevent the players from sharing their save files. The secret key can be tied
to the device that they use to play, or it can be tied to a social account like
Facebook or GameCenter account. On mobile platforms both Android and
iOS provide an API to get a unique identifier of the player that can be used
to generate the secret key.
Encrypting the save and the data files usually prevents the cheaters from
tampering the files. But in theory, it is possible to decrypt the data without
using the key. The attack can use a brute force attack to crack the encryption,
but it usually requires significant computational resources. Also, the attacker
could try to reverse engineer the game’s binaries to find the cryptographic
algorithm and the key that were used to encrypt the data. In the chapter 2.4
we study how to prevent the attacker from reverse engineering the game.
Encrypting and decrypting the data can also affect to the performance of
the game due to extra computations of the cryptographic algorithm. There
are many different cryptographic algorithms available for different platforms
and some of them might be faster than other. Usually, this means that they
use slightly weaker cryptographic algorithms to improve performance. The
Twofish cipher is one of the fastest cryptographic algorithms and it is similar
to the AES cipher [31].
2.2 Memory editing
2.2.1 Introduction
Using memory modifying cheats is one of the easiest thing to do in games.
Especially on the desktop operating systems like Windows or Linux based
systems there are many different tools available. Some of them are free
and some of them are paid applications. Some of them are tailored for a
particular game and then there are also general-purpose tools that can work
with any game. Cheaters are using the memory modifying tools to tamper
the memory used by the game. By tampering the memory, they can change
values within the game which gives them a significant advantage in any game.
Memory editing cheats are usually used to give the player unlimited ammo
or health or a huge amount of the game’s currency that is used to buy items
in the game. They can also change a high score value to be a significantly
higher value before it submitted to a leaderboard. Sometimes there is no
need to modify the values but instead the cheaters might use these tools to
see what their opponents are actually doing in the game. The cheater could
use the memory editing tool find how much resources their opponent has or in
what position their opponent is located in an online multiplayer game. This
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requires that the cheater has access to the opponent’s game state. Usually
the game exchanges the game states with the other players frequently in an
online multiplayer game in order to keep the game synchronized. In the next
section we investigate what kind of memory editing tools are available for
cheaters and how they can be used to cheat.
2.2.2 Using memory editing cheat tools
The Cheat Engine is probably the most widely used cheat tool for memory
editing. It is an open source cheat tool and it comes with a collection of
different tools including a debugger, disassembler, assembler, speedhack and
memory scanner [15]. The memory scanner can be used to scan for values
within a game and it also supports for modifying these values. Cheaters
can use the memory scanner to give them infinite amount of lives or a huge
amount of gold that can be then used inside the game. The memory scanner
searches the memory for the memory address of the specified value. In order
to find the memory address of the value the user needs first to enter an
initial value that the scanner should search for. The value must be exactly
the same value as in the game. For example, if the player has 100 gold in
the game, then it should set the initial value to 100. Next the user must
trigger the first scan where the memory scanner looks for all the matching
values in the memory. Usually, after the first scan there are hundreds or even
thousands of matching values. In order to narrow the results, the user needs
to change the value in the game to another value and after that the memory
scanner can scan again the addresses of the values in the previous results
to see if any of the values matches to the new value. For example, for the
second scan the player spends 20 gold so that the value changes from 100
gold to 80 gold. Now in the second scan the player searches for all values that
matches to 80 using the previous results. This should narrow the number
of results and it is repeated until there are only one or a few matches left.
For the remaining matches the user can try to modify the values using the
memory scanner and see in the game if the value has actually changed. The
figure 2.1 shows the Cheat Engine’s user-interface for the memory scanner
and the options available for the scanning process. The user can search for
different value types like integer or floating-point values and also specify the
memory address range to search. It also supports a fast scan where it uses
an optimized algorithm to search the value, but it might not find all values.
Internally the Cheat Engine uses the low-level kernel APIs to attach to
other processes and to read their memory. On Windows the Cheat Engine
uses OpenProcess, ReadProcessMemory and WriteProcessMemory functions
from the Windows API. These functions require that the user has elevated
14


required to run cheat tools on the device. For example, the iGameGuardian
requires a root access to function properly. Jailbreaking the iOS device is
also needed to install the cheat tools because they don’t conform the App
Store review guidelines thus they are not downloadable from the Apple’s
App Store. Android supports sideloading the apps from other places than
the official Google Play Store but on iOS you can only install the apps from
the App Store. Jailbreaking the iOS device removes these imposed software
restrictions. The jailbreaking process is very similar to how the Android de-
vices are rooted and it requires the same amount of work or even more. Also,
there can be legitimate apps on iOS that may disable some of their features
if the app is running on a device that is jailbroken due the security issues it
imposes.
We could not find any cheat tools with memory editing capabilities that
didn’t required either rooting or jailbreaking the device. One way to get
around the problem of rooting the Android device is to use an emulator. The
Android Emulator comes with the official Android SDK and it can be used to
simulate different Android phones and tablets. The Android Emulator also
supports rooting thus the cheaters can install the cheat tool and the game
to the emulator. After using the cheat tool in the emulator, the player can
transfer the game’s save files from the emulator to another device if needed.
2.2.3 Protecting against memory editing
Encryption can be used to protect values from the memory editing. The idea
is to obfuscate all the significant values so that it becomes increasingly hard
to find the values using the memory scanner. This means that we should
encrypt values that have a real importance for the game like the amount
of gold the player has in the inventory or the player’s health and ammo
values. If we would try to protect all the values in the game, it would have
a significant negative impact to the game’s performance because encrypting
and decrypting the values adds up the CPU cycles. Also, depending on the
algorithm used it would increase the memory usage. One of the easiest way
to encrypt integer values is to multiply them with a specific value before
they are stored to the memory. When integer value is read from the memory
then the value is first divided with the same value that was used to multiply
it. Another option is to use communicative function such as XOR that was
suggested by Pritchard[26]. Bitwise XOR sets the bits in the result to 1
if either, but not both, of the corresponding bits in the two operands is
1. When the value is stored to the memory it is encrypted using the XOR
function and a predefined encryption value. When the value is read from
the memory it is decrypted using the same XOR function and the same
17

the program’s address space. To prevent this exploit the game should avoid
using static variables store values that are critical for the game. Instead
they should use dynamic memory allocation to allocate the variables to heap
memory. When the variable is allocated using the heap memory the address
of the value is different every time the game executable is run.
2.2.4 Summary
The memory editing cheat tools are a serious threat for games because they
are very easy to use and there many articles available in the Internet that
teaches how to use them efficiently in games. Also, many of the memory
editing tools are free including the most popular ones. But the games can
try to protect against these tools by using different methods. Encrypting the
values that are important for the game is a viable way to protect against the
memory editing tools. As we learned in the previous section encryption can
be used to hide the significant values from the memory scanners. Another
way is to use hashes and checksums to determine if the significant values were
changed by an external process or application. Both methods have an im-
pact to the games performance because the values must be either encrypted
or decrypted when they are accessed. These operations can become a bot-
tleneck if the values are accessed frequently in the game. Another downside
of these memory protection methods is that they rely on the secrecy of the
implementation. If the cheaters manage to figure out the algorithm that was
used to encrypt the values or to calculate the checksum value, then they can
easily circumvent the protection.
The situation is similar on the mobile platforms. There are memory edit-
ing cheat tools available for both major platforms: iOS and Android. These
tools have the same capabilities as their counterparts on the desktop plat-
forms. Both iOS and Android platforms have a strict control on the appli-
cations that can be used, and they use sandboxing to control what resources
the applications may use including the memory and file system resources.
But these restrictions can be avoided by either rooting or jailbreaking the
device which is required in order to use the memory editing tools on the
mobile platforms. The good thing is that the rooting and the jailbreaking
process can be very complex for the cheater. Also, they might not want to
do it because it makes the device vulnerable for other threats like malware.
To avoid this problem the cheater can use an emulator with rooted access
instead of the cheater’s own phone or tablet.
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2.3 Time cheating
2.3.1 Introduction
Not all cheats need complex instructions or additional tools in order to use
them. Time cheats are easy to execute because all you need to do is to
change the system time from the operating system settings. There are a lot
of games that are built around time mechanics where players must often wait
for a specific duration until they can do the next action. Crafting games are
a very popular game genre where the gameplay mechanics revolve around
producing different items. Usually, in order to produce an item, the player
must wait for a specific amount of time that can last from minutes to hours
until the item can be collected. Players might try to cheat this by changing
the system time so that the clock time goes forward. When the player returns
to the game, the game needs to determine how much time has passed since
the last time the player was in the game. Usually they rely on the system
time that is accessible via an API provided by the operating system. The
amount of time elapsed is calculated by subtracting a system time value,
that was stored when the player was last time in the game, from the current
system time value. The elapsed time value is then used to advance the
timers in the game. If the player moved the system time one hour forward
the game would think that the same amount of time has already passed in
the game. In the case of the crafting game this gives the cheater an ability
to produce more items in a very little time and thus giving the cheater an
advantage. Speed hacks Another time-based cheat method is a speed hack.
Speed hacks are used to give the cheater a significant boost to movement or
to firing speeds which makes it harder for the other to defeat the cheater in
the game. Some speed hacks are also used to slow down the action, so that
the cheater has more time to react to the events of the game. For example,
in a platformer game where the player must dodge obstacles or projectiles
the cheater might use a speed hack that actually slows down the game, so
that the cheater would have more time to react and give the correct inputs
to avoid the obstacles and projectiles.
The Cheat Engine that was presented in the chapter 2.2.2 supports speed
hacks that either decreases or increases the speed of the game. It uses a
hook that alters the behaviour of the timing functions in the game. The
Cheat Engine intercepts the function call when the game tries to get the
current system time using a DLL injection technique. Instead of returning
the correct time value it returns a modified value that makes the game think
that either more time has elapsed or less time has elapsed. If the game
thinks that more time has elapsed, then the game will be running faster and
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vice versa. Preventing the speed hacks from working is very difficult because
the game needs to be able to detect if the timing functions are hijacked by
the cheat tool. Also, the cheat tools are often using different techniques to
prevent the game from detecting if a malicious DLL was loaded.
2.3.2 Detecting time cheats
Detecting if the player is using a time cheat is a very challenging task because
there is no single reliable way to detect it on the client-side. Especially, if the
time cheat is using the DLL injection technique it is very likely that it will
be not detected. But if the player tries to cheat time by manually changing
the system time it is possible to detect it. In order to achieve this, we need
to be able to calculate the elapsed time using timing functions that do not
depend on the system time. On Unix-like systems the system time can be
get using the gettimeofday system call which gives the number of seconds and
microseconds since the Epoch [2]. The Epoch is an absolute time value that is
the number of seconds elapsed since January 1, 1970 (midnight UTC/GMT).
The problem is that when the user changes the system time it also affects to
the gettimeofday function.
An alternative way to calculate the elapsed time is to use the system
uptime that is typically the amount of time the system has been working and
available. The system uptime is a relative time that doesn’t have any fixed
reference date and it is unaffected by the system time changes. Because there
is no fixed reference date it might return the same value at different times,
so we can’t use it directly to measure the elapsed time in the game, but we
can use it to validate the elapsed time that was calculated using the system
time. So, when we store the system time we also store the system uptime
value. When the elapsed time is calculated we calculate the time difference
between the last stored system time and the current system time but also we
calculate the time difference between the last stored system uptime and the
current system uptime and then compare the differences between the system
time and the system uptime. If the player did not change the system time,
then the system time and system uptime should be the same. There might
be slight differences in the values if the system time and the system uptime
are using different clock resolutions. If the elapsed time calculated using the
system time is notably larger than the elapsed system uptime, then we can
assume that the player did change the system time. In this case we would
use the elapsed system uptime to update the timers in the game instead
of the elapsed system time. There is a one case where the system uptime
cannot be used to detect if the player changed the system time. If the player
restarts the computer or the device the system uptime values is also reset.
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This means that the elapsed system uptime value can be a negative value
if the current system uptime value is smaller than the stored value. In this
case we can’t validate the elapsed system time. The cheaters can exploit this
weakness because they can first change the system time and then restart the
device, thus making it impossible to detect if the system time was changed.
The system uptime value can be get using the clock gettime function that
is defined in the POSIX standard [1]. It is preferred to use the CLOCK MONOTONIC RAW
clock instead of the CLOCK UPTIME RAW clock because the CLOCK UPTIME RAW
does not increment while the system is asleep. On mobile devices this
would mean that the CLOCK UPTIME RAW clock is not incremented when
the device is in the sleep mode. Both CLOCK MONOTONIC RAW and
CLOCK UPTIME RAW clocks are unaffected by frequency or time adjust-
ments. The clock gettime function is supported by the most operating sys-
tems including the Android and the iOS operating systems.
2.4 Reverse engineering
2.4.1 Introduction
Chikofsky et. al.[9] defines the reverse engineering as a process of analyzing
a subject system to identify the system’s components and their interrelation-
ships. Also, they note that the reverse engineering can be used to create
representations of the system in another or at a higher level of abstraction.
Cheaters can use different reverse engineering techniques to learn how the
game logic works and to access sensitive information like the cryptographic
algorithms that are used to protect the game data from tampering. The
cheater can decompile the game binaries using a tool to obtain the source
code of the application. Using the source code, the cheater could find all the
cryptographic algorithms that were used to encrypt the data in the game.
For example, the cheater could use the source code to find out how to cir-
cumvent the memory protection methods that were presented in the chapter
2.2.3. Also, the cheater could use the source code to find exploits in the game
logic.
Programming languages that compile the source code into intermediate
languages are vulnerable for reverse engineering. The original source code
can be obtained from the intermediate language code using a decompilation
tool. C# is a very popular programming language that belongs to the .NET
programming languages developed by Microsoft. Many game engines, includ-
ing the Unity3D, are using the C# programming language. The C# source
code files are compiled into intermediate language code called Common In-
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termediate Language (CIL). At the runtime the CIL code is transformed to
machine code by the Common Language Runtime (CLR) which is then ex-
ecuted by the computer. In order to translate the CIL code the interpreter
needs to know the names of the classes, methods and fields. This makes the
CIL code vulnerable for decompilation because it contains all the original
names of the classes, methods and fields which makes the decompiled source
code to easier to read and understand.
2.4.2 Code obfuscation
Code obfuscation is a process where the source code is transformed so that it
is difficult to read for humans [23]. The code obfuscation can be used to make
it harder to reverse engineer the game from the binaries. The obfuscated
code does not change the functionality of the program and the output of the
program remains unchanged. But it makes the source code more difficult to
understand when it is decompiled from the binaries.
Name obfuscation is the most common technique to obfuscate the source
code. Usually, in the original source code the names of the classes, methods
and fields have a meaningful name that describes what they are used for.
When the code is compiled into the intermediate code these names are pre-
served. The name obfuscation is used to replace the names of the classes,
methods and fields to meaningless strings. The figure 2.4 shows an example
method before and after the name obfuscation process. String encryption
is another code obfuscation technique and it is used to hide strings in the
code that are easily readable from the binaries or from the decompiled source
code. The string value is encrypted at compilation and when it is accessed
on the runtime the value is decrypted. It prevents the attacker from finding
critical code sections by looking for string references inside the binary. For
example, the attacker could try to search code sections where a specific error
code is used. It can be also used to prevent the attacker from finding the
encryption keys that are defined in the source code and used in cryptographic
algorithms. Also, it can be used to hide secret keys that are often required
when communicating with web services. Control flow obfuscation makes the
control flow of the program difficult to understand. It adds conditional in-
structions to the code that are always either true or false. These conditional
instructions are used to increase branching in the code which makes it very
difficult to follow. The obfuscator can also insert dummy code into the ex-
ecutable. The dummy code does not affect to the logic of the program, but
the extra logic can make the decompiled code more difficult to analyze.
The code obfuscation is easy to perform because there lots of tools avail-
able for different programming languages that provide various techniques to
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Chapter 3
Server-side cheat detection and
prevention
Online games are very popular today on all platforms. There are countless
online games available on PCs, game consoles and mobile devices. It seems
like online features are required to succeed in the gaming industry. For
example, most of the new and well-known AAA-games on PC and console
platforms implement at least the basic multiplayer features. On mobile,
many of the top grossing games in the App Store and Google Play store have
features like leaderboards, guilds and PvP-combat. All online games require
a computer network, such as the Internet, and a server to connect with in
order to player the game online.
In this chapter we will study different client-server architectures that
are used in online games to communicate between the client and the server
and how these architectures can used to detect and prevent cheating in the
games. First, in the chapter 3.1 we examine the benefits of using a secure
communication to prevent cheating in games and what kind of vulnerabilities
the cheaters can use in the client-server communication to their advantage.
In the chapter 3.2 we study and compare different client-server architectures
in games and how they can used in protecting against cheaters.
3.1 Secure communication
3.1.1 Introduction
Security and especially network security has become increasingly important
part of the software design. Nowadays users are more aware of the prob-
lems of using unsecured communication and data it could possibly expose.
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Having a secure communication between the client and server is important
for both applications and games. Games especially might have very specific
requirements. For example, intensive FPS multiplayer games require mini-
mal latency when sending the input actions over the network to the game’s
server. Popular mobile games are required to be able to handle hundreds
of thousands of simultaneous players. Adding a layer of security might in-
crease latencies and decrease server performance but it also provides a way to
protect against cheaters. There are many ways how cheaters can exploit the
unsecure communication. This can vary from message replication to actually
modifying the message content. Creating a secure connection between the
client and the server provides security through obscurity because it prevents
cheaters from reading and modifying the transmitted messages.
3.1.2 Securing connection using HTTP over TLS
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) are the most popular cryptographic protocols that provide commu-
nications security over a computer network. [11] TLS is specified in RFC
5246 by Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). SSL protocol is specified
in RFC 6101, but the use of SSL has been later prohibited due to its vul-
nerabilities [13] [39] [4]. The TLS protocol is commonly used over HTTP to
secure communication between servers and web browsers. This protocol is
known as HTTPS protocol and it specified in RFC 2818 [28]. The TLS pro-
vides both privacy and data integrity. It prevents eavesdropping, tampering
and message forgery because it uses symmetric cryptography to encrypt the
transmitted data. The TLS also supports authentication of the client and
the server using public-key cryptography. Integrity is ensured by including
integrity check using a message authentication code.
The protocol is composed of two layers: TLS record and TLS handshake
protocols. The TLS handshake protocol is used to negotiate a stateful con-
nection. The handshake procedure includes the following steps: agreement of
the protocol version to use, cipher suite selection, authentication of the server
(and optionally the client) and session key information exchange. The client
sends first a ClientHello message that lists cryptographic information such as
the supported TLS versions, supported cipher suites and a random number.
The server responds with a ServerHello message that contains the selected
TLS version and cipher suite. These are chosen from the list provided by
the client. The message also contains another random number. Optionally
the server may include a session id that can be used to perform a resumed
handshake. Next, the server sends a Certificate message that contains the
server’s digital certificate that includes the server’s public key. The client ver-
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There have been serious attacks on TLS over the years and the protocol
have been updated several times to add new features, stronger cipher suites
and to remove older weak ciphers. IETF has released RFC 7457 [34] that
summarizes the known attacks on TLS and DTLS. They have also released
RFC 7525 [33] that provides recommendations for secure use of TLS and
DTLS which includes recommended cipher suites because some cryptographic
algorithms that were once considered strong have weakened over time. There
have been also serious vulnerabilities in softwares implementing the TLS
protocol. One of the most notable vulnerability is the Heartbleed bug that
affected popular OpenSSL cryptographic software library. The bug allowed
attackers to steal private keys from servers using a buffer over-read bug. This
allowed attackers to eavesdrop communication and tamper with the data. In
the next section we study an attack that can be used against TLS protocol.
3.1.3 Protecting against man-in-the-middle attacks
One of the potential ways to cheat in games is to intercept communication
between the client and the server. A possible scenario occurs when a player
finishes a level and the client reports the final score of the level to the server
for updating the leaderboard. In this case the client sends a HTTP request
to the server that contains the final score, but the player could intercept this
request using a third-party tool and modify the final score to be a higher
value. This type of attack is known as a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack
where the communication between two systems is intercepted and it is com-
monly used to eavesdrop or alter traffic for malicious purposes [27]. The
attack relies on the fact that the attacker can impersonate each endpoint, so
that they believe that they are communicating directly with each other. This
can be achieved by splitting the connection into two different connections.
First, when the client attempts to connect to the server, the attacker inter-
cepts this connection. Instead of creating a connection between the server
and the client it creates a connection between the client and the attacker.
After the connection is established with the client the attacker connects to
the server by relaying client requests to the server. Now the attacker acts as
a proxy between the client and the server and it can now read and modify
the messages that are sent between the endpoints. Figure 3.2 shows how the
new client and server connections are created by the attacker’s proxy.
The man-in-the-middle attack can be used to circumvent mutual authen-
tication where two endpoints authenticate each other using some protocol
before actually exchanging any data. For example, in the case of a public
key certificate authentication when the client asks for the server’s public key,
the attacker intercepts this and includes its own forged public key instead of
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Figure 3.2: Attacker works as a proxy in the man-in-the-middle attack.
the server’s public key. Now the client thinks that the public key comes from
the server, but it actually encrypts messages using the forged key which the
attacker can now decrypt. When the attacker communicates with the server
it uses the server’s public key in the same way as the client would normally
do. As presented in the previous section TLS can be used to protect from the
MITM attack because the client and the server exchange certificates which
are issued and verified by a trusted third-party certificate authority (CA).
In the TLS protocol the client would reject the attacker’s forged certificate
and drop the connection because it is not issued by a trusted CA. But this
works only if the client itself is not vulnerable. Callegati et al. [6] have pre-
sented such an attack that replaces the original certificate authenticating the
HTTPS server with a modified certificate. The weakness of the attack is that
it requires that the client first trusts the forged certificate. But in the case
of cheating where the client is actually the attacker it can be expected that
the client trusts the forged certificate. In the next section we demonstrate
how the attack can be executed on a mobile phone using called mitmproxy
command line tool.
Mitmproxy is a free and open source interactive HTTPS proxy which
can be used to intercept, inspect, modify and replay web traffic such as
HTTP or any other SSL/TLS-protected protocols[10]. Mitmproxy acts as a
certificate authority that dynamically generates certificates to any hostname.
In order to use mitmproxy the cheater would need to install the tool on a
computer that that is connected to the same network as the phone. Next,
the mitmproxy CA certificate needs to be first downloaded and then installed
on the phone manually from the device settings. Also, to intercept phone’s
HTTP/HTTPS connections the standard gateway address of the phone must
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HTTPS while browsing web pages where they measured page load times, data
usage and power consumption on a mobile device. Their results show that
HTTPS increased page load times more than 500ms in 90% of websites when
using 3G network and the average TLS negotiation overhead was around 5%
in data usage. Also, there was a notable decrease in battery life when using
HTTPS in 3G network. Goldberg et al. [14] have also compared HTTP
and HTTPS performance on the server side and they measured a decrease in
transfer rate that was around 20% which was considered as a reasonable price
to pay for security. This could lead to slightly increased server costs when
using HTTPS. HTTPS supports session IDs and session tickets [sources] that
can be used to resume the TLS handshake and avoid a full handshake. This
can reduce latencies of the requests after the first request but it also depends
on how long the session IDs and session tickets cached on the client and the
server. This may vary depending on the platform.
3.2 Client-server architectures
3.2.1 Introduction
In the client-server model clients and servers communicate with each other
via messages. This message exchange pattern is known as a request-response
messaging pattern [18]. In this pattern the client connects to the server
using a communication protocol that works on the application layer and is
understood both the client and the server. Once the connection is established,
the client can make a request by sending a message to the server which is then
decoded and processed by the server. After processing the request, the server
sends a response message back to the client. Usually this response message
contains a result value indicating if the request was successfully completed.
Depending on the used protocol, the server can either close the connection
after sending the response message or maintain the connection to the client.
If the connection is not closed, the server can listen for more messages and
also send messages to the client.
In distributed computing clients are distributed across multiple different
servers depending on various factors, such as location and server load [21].
However, games are often using a more traditional client-server model where
a single server provides resources to all clients.
The client-server model allows executing game logic on the server instead
of on the client. This allows the system to validate the player’s actions before
they are applied on the server’s game state or sent to other clients. Using
different validation techniques, the server can verify that the requests sent
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by the client are actually plausible in the game. For example, the client
could send a request where the player moves to a position that should be not
possible from the previous position of the player. The server can validate
this request by calculating the distance moved and determine if the player
can move such distances. The server can also repeat the player’s input on the
server and determine if the server’s outcome matches to the client’s outcome.
If the server thinks that the request is not possible the request fails validation
and it is rejected. The position change is not stored in the game server’s state.
There are many different designs how to implement the client-server
model and in the next chapters we will take a look on the client-server models
that are commonly used in games. This includes the client-authoritative and
the server-authoritative models.
The client-server model is not the only architecture that is used in on-
line games. A peer-to-peer (P2P) model is also widely used in many games
because it doesn’t require a centralized server. In the chapter 3.2.4 we also
study how P2P model works and what needs to be considered when protect-
ing against cheaters in P2P model.
3.2.2 Client authoritative model
The client authoritative model is probably the most commonly used client-
server architecture in games. In this model the client runs the game logic
and sends the result to the server that trusts that the client’s result is valid
without validating the data. The client authoritative model is very popular
because it is easy to implement on top of an existing client-only architecture.
Quite often games are first developed using a client-only architecture and
then later in the development process features that requires a cooperation
with a server are added in the game. Another reason to only implement a
client authoritative model is that the more complex client-server architec-
tures might not be considered as a necessity due to the nature of the game.
For example, games that are single player or have only light multiplayer fea-
tures, such as high score leaderboards, implementing a fully-fledged server
authoritative model might considerably increase the development time and
costs due to the added complexity. Many of the casual games that have only
these simple multiplayer features , are client authoritative because the player
competes usually against itself and not with other players. Game genres such
as puzzle, arcade and trivia games, are good examples of casual games that
are often client authoritative.
In the client authoritative model most of the game logic is executed on
the client-side. The server assumes that the actions sent by the client are
to be trusted and that there is no need to validate the actions. This can
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simplify the server-side implementation of the game logic and significantly
lighten the load on the server-side, but it also makes the game vulnerable
for cheating. The client authoritative model relies on client-side techniques
to prevent cheating. In chapter 2 we presented various techniques that can
implemented on the client-side to protect from different types of cheating
techniques. The client authoritative model works so that the player actions
are first executed in the client’s game logic after which the actions are sent to
the server. The content of the message sent to the server can vary depending
on how the client authoritative model is implemented on the server-side. The
message can contain the action that was executed on the client which is then
also executed on the server. The message can also contain only the result
of the action that was executed on the client. This can be implemented by
sending the delta between the previously sent state and the current state
of the client. This approach allows the server to skip the execution part
of the action and instead it can use directly the client’s result of the same
action to update the game state on the server and thus improve the server
performance. This is only possible in the client authoritative model because
it assumes that the messages sent by the client are always valid. For example,
a player does an action that opens a chest in the game which gives a random
item to the player. In this case the client sends only a message that contains
the given random item to the server and the server adds the item to player’s
inventory without first validating the action on the server side. To reduce
the number of messages sent to the server, the client can combine multiple
actions into a single action that is then sent to the server.
In the terms of performance client authoritative model offers a good op-
portunity because the client authoritative model allows moving all the heavy
work on the client-side. The obvious problem of the client authoritative
model is that it relies on the client-side cheat detection and prevention. In
the chapter 2 we have already learned that it is very difficult to implement ef-
fective client-side cheat prevention techniques. Without any client-side cheat
prevention techniques the client authoritative model is extremely vulnerable
for cheating.
A good example of the drawbacks of the client authoritative model is the
Super Meat Boy video game. Super Meat Boy is a critically well received
platform game that has been released on all major platforms including PC,
Xbox 360 and PlayStation 4. In the game the player controls a character that
must complete various levels by jumping and running on platforms to reach
the end of the level. Each level completion was graded by the elapsed time
and the time was also recorded to a global leaderboard. The game became a
hit and it sold over million copies. Soon after the leaderboards started filling
with times that were impossible to achieve and players started to complain
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about cheaters on the forums. The game didn’t have any validation for the
leaderboard scores and it was lacking any client-side protection from cheating.
To make things worse one of the players found that the address, username
and password of the leaderboard database were stored in plain-text in the
game’s code and it was sending the level scores directly to the database [36].
This allowed anyone to modify the leaderboards without even playing the
game. This caused some bad publicity and active players abandoned the
game due to persistent cheaters.
3.2.3 Server authoritative model
Running the game logic on the client makes the game vulnerable for cheating
as we have seen in the previous chapters. Software developers often say that
you can never trust the client because it can be corrupted or altered. This
is also very much the case in the game development. To avoid this problem
the game logic can be fully executed on the server-side. This server-side
architecture is known as a server authoritative model where the server has
the authority over the clients to what happens in the game. In other words,
the game logic is only run on the server and the client sends only actions or
key inputs to the server. The server-authoritative model is suitable for many
different types of online multiplayer games, such as fast paced first-person
shooters, massive multiplayer online games or turn-based games.
In the server authoritative model, the game client doesn’t run any actual
game logic but instead it immediately sends the actions made by the player
to the server. The message that is sent to the server contains only the action
that the player is going to make, for example the input key that was pressed
or the name of the action to execute. This is significantly different from the
client-authoritative model where the client actually sends the result of the
action to the server. When the server receives the client’s message it executes
the action inside the server’s game logic. The game logic running inside the
server uses the server’s own game state that does not depend on any way on
the client’s game state. After processing the action and updating the game
state on the server, the result of the action is returned to the client. The
result contains the server’s updated game state. The client then uses the
result to update its own local game state. The result is also broadcast to
other clients by the server in order to keep all clients synchronized of the
changes made by the other clients.
In most of the cases the clients can act as ”dummy terminals” that only
update their visual representation of the game state because the server is
running all the game logic and the clients are only relaying the input actions
to the server. In other words, the clients can be thought of being spectators
35
because they can’t affect to how the actions are executed. They can only
affect to what actions are executed. From the programming point of view
this simplifies how the client can be developed because the client doesn’t
execute any game logic and it only needs to update its visual representation
of the game state.
The server authoritative model provides great protection against cheaters
because it renders many of the client-side cheats useless. Typical client-side
cheats where the game state is modified on the client do not have any effect
because the actual game state is stored on the server which cannot access
directly by the client. For example, the player uses a cheat that modifies
the client’s game state so that the player has over 9000 energy instead of the
actual value of 10. This change has no effect to the game because on the
server’s game state the player still has only 10 energy. The next time the
client’s game state is updated, the energy amount is changed to match the
server’s energy amount. Another benefit of running the game logic only only
on the server and excluding the logic from the client, we can prevent cheaters
from decompiling the client executable and accessing the game logic code.
This prevents cheaters from learning any information from the game logic
that could give them any advantage in the game. A good example of this
would bea poker game where the cheater could use the decompiled code to
analyze how the playing cards are randomized and thus gaining a significant
advantage over other players.
Although the server authoritative model prevents many of the client-side
cheats it is still vulnerable for some cheats. One of the potential ways to cheat
in a server authoritative model is to modify the messages that are sent to the
server. If the server doesn’t validate the action before actually executing the
action, the attacker can send actions that would not be possible for the player.
One example of this is where the cheater is firing a weapon and the client
sends a message that contains an action that says the player shot weapon
to a specific direction. The cheater could use the man-in-the-middle attack
to hijack the message between the client and the server and then change the
shooting direction to point to the opponent even if the opponent was not
visible in the player’s view. The server will not notice this cheat unless it
validates the shooting direction by comparing the previous direction to the
shooting direction. Another way to cheat in server authoritative model is
to use information exposure -cheats on the client-side. The cheater can use
the hidden information that is not visible for the player in the client’s game
state to gain advantage over other players. In an online multiplayer strategy
game, the cheater can expose the opponent’s unit locations if the server
always sends the unit movement action results to all players. The cheater
can read the changed unit positions from the client’s game state that is stored
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in the device memory using the tools described in chapter 2.2. To protect
from these kinds of cheats the client should only have partial information of
the state of the game. A better approach would be that the server would
determine if the result is relevant to other players before sending the results.
If not, the server should postpone sending the result to the other players. In
this particular case the relevancy would be determined if the unit is visible
on the player’s view area.
One of the drawbacks of the server authoritative model is that every
action needs to be run through the server. This means that there can be
delays between when the action is triggered and when the game state is
actually changed. These delays can be notable especially in fast paced games
and make the game feel unresponsive. To tackle this problem the client
can use latency compensation methods like client-side prediction. In the
client-side prediction the client assumes that the server will accept the action
thus the client executes the action immediately on the client before actually
receiving the result from the server. This method requires that the client
can predict the result of the action either by running the actual game logic
or using a simplified version of it. When the client receives the actual result
from the server the, client can correct the predicted result using the server’s
result. The client-side prediction method is used in many FPS multiplayer
games including Half-Life and Counter-Strike [5].
3.2.4 Peer-to-peer model
According to definition by Schollmeier [32], a distributed network architec-
ture may be called a peer-to-peer network, if the participants share a part
of their own hardware resources (processing power, storage capacity, net-
work link capacity) with others. The definition emphasizes that these shared
resources are necessary to provide the service and content offered by the
network and they are accessible by other peers directly, without passing in-
termediary entities. The participants of such a network are thus resource
providers as well as resource requesters [32]. When compared to the client-
server model, in the peer-to-peer model clients are directly connected to each
other and each act as a client and a server, thus there is no need for a central
server.
The peer-to-peer model has been very popular in games. Many of the very
first online FPS (first person shooter) multiplayer games were exclusively
using P2P model because having a centralized client-server model would be
too expensive to maintain due to high performance requirements and slow
internet connections. Also, the peer-to-peer model has been used in many
MMO (massive multiplayer online) games where there can be hundreds or
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even thousands of players playing together at the same time. With the peer-
to-peer model games have been able to move the network bandwidth load
from the server to the peers because each peer acts as both a client and a
server thus removing the need for a centralized server. Unfortunately this
approach also includes a problem because in the peer-to-peer model peers
are either non-authoritative or there is a single peer that is authoritative. If
all peers are non-authoritative then each of them is responsible of their own
state. If the peer’s state changes it sends a message to other peers to update
their state. The problem is that the other peers can’t reject the change if they
question the validity of the message because they don’t have any authority
over changes made by the other peers. This makes the peer-to-peer model
vulnerable for cheating. Having a single peer with authority doesn’t solve the
problem completely because it still allows the authoritative peer to cheat. In
the next section we will study a peer-to-peer model design that tries to solve
this very problem.
In their paper, Jardine and Zappala [19] present a hybrid architecture that
uses both a client-server and a peer-to-peer architectures. In this architecture
there is a single central server and multiple regional servers. The central
server is responsible for managing state-changing moves of the players. All
players must send their state-changing moves directly to the central server
which are then processed by the central server. The central server determines
if each state change is valid and sends a response to the player. If the state
change was a valid move, then the central server sends the move to the
appropriate regional server which then distributes the move to all players in
its region. Regional servers are used to divide the game in regions and they
are responsible to distribute all positional moves. The central server controls
which players act as regional servers. When a player makes a positional move,
it sends the move to the regional server to which the player is connected.
Next, the regional server distributes the move to other players connected to
the region. Positional moves are never sent to the central server. This hybrid
architecture provides great scalability because the peers are distributing the
less important updates to other players and the central server handles only
important state changing updates, thus significantly reducing the load on the
central server. Also, it provides a good protection against cheating because
the central server manages the important game state changes and regional
server are only managing positional changes that have only low impact to
the actual gameplay. Furthermore, it limits cheating only to players that
act as regional server because they are distributing the central server’s state
changing moves. Thus, they can either refuse sending the moves forward
or delay them. This can give some advantage to the player that acts as a
regional server. To prevent this the players can monitor updates from the
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regional server and report if the latency is high or updates are dropped to
the central server. After certain amount of reports the central server can
then change the player who acts as a regional server.
The peer-to-peer architecture provides a great scalability for games while
keeping the operational costs low due to the reduced traffic between the game
service and the players. These cost savings can be a major reason especially
for smaller game companies and indie developers to choose the peer-to-peer
architecture. It also removes the reliance on a single server as anyone can
act as a server. From the cheating point of view the peer-to-peer provides
a limited protection against cheating. Peers that are acting as servers have
the authority on the game state which gives them a possibility to cheat
without being detected by the other peers. This can be prevented by having
multiple peers acting as authoritative servers and requiring that each of them
must first accept the player’s state change before it can be actually applied.
Another way to prevent cheating is to limit peers so that they can’t act as
a server in their own region. Both solutions can increase the complexity
of the game’s architecture. Also, handling cases where the acting server is
transferred to another peer can be a very demanding and complex operation.
This can cause notable delays in the game and in the worst case the delays
can be frequent if peers have poor connections.
Another downside of the peer-to-peer architecture is that that the peers
acting as servers consume more network bandwidth and requires more pro-
cessing power. This can be a problem especially for mobile devices as we
found in chapter 3.1.4 that network traffic significantly increases power con-
sumption. Also, mobile devices have less processing power than PCs and
consoles. Latencies can be high and there can be sudden connection losses
when using a mobile network. Furthermore, peers consume more bandwidth
compared to the clients in the client-server architectures because they must
send the messages to all other peers. In the client-server architectures the
client sends the messages only to the server. Also, players on mobile devices
might dislike peer-to-peer architecture because it can increase their operator
data plan costs due to the increased bandwidth usage.
3.3 Summary
The use of the server-side architectures provide a significant advantage over
cheating. Especially, the server authoritative models provide a great protec-
tion against the common cheats that are very effective against client-only
architectures. The server authoritative model is easy to implement when the
game is designed from the beginning to be server authoritative. Switching
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in the middle of the development to the server authoritative model might
require a significant investment and can be proven to be difficult to imple-
ment afterwards. The better approach in this case would be using the client
authoritative model that provides only a limited protection but is much eas-
ier to implement afterwards. The main problem of the server authoritative
model is the increased latency. Especially when the client device is using a
mobile network that usually have notably higher latencies than other net-
works. To mitigate the latency issues and make the game appear smoother,
the client can use the client-side prediction methods.
The peer-to-peer model also provides a suitable protection against cheat-
ing, but it is more complex to implement and more vulnerable than the
server authoritative model. The peer-to-peer model can be an attractive
option when trying to minimize the maintenance costs of the servers. The
decentralized architecture of the P2P also means that there is no single point
of failure.
The server-side architectures might provide a great protection against
cheating, but they are also vulnerable to other problems. One such problem
is scaling the server capacity depending on the number of active players. The
other issue is that server-side architectures are vulnerable to denial-of-service
attacks. In the worst case these issues can lead to a scenario where the game
service is unavailable for the players and preventing them from playing the
game.
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Chapter 4
Client-server architecture for mo-
bile games
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will present our architecture for a mobile game where we
have taken special attention to prevent cheating in the game. The archi-
tecture is designed using the lessons learned from the previous chapters and
it is also especially designed to take mobile game requirements into consid-
eration. The architecture is designed for a mobile game that is mainly a
single player game, but it should also support online multiplayer features,
like leaderboards, guilds and asynchronous multiplayer. In the asynchronous
multiplayer part of the game, players are matched against each other and
they compete in a shared activity using a turn-based gameplay between two
or more players. Since the application for the planned architecture is mobile
games where the devices can have limited and unreliable mobile networks,
we have focused on efficient communication between the client and the server
on the architecture. While designing the architecture we have paid atten-
tion to minimize the latency when executing the actions made by the player
especially in the single player mode. Also, the architecture is designed so
that the game is playable even if the network connection drops for a longer
duration.
From the cheaters point of view, we have assumed that they have a full
access to the game on the client-side. This means that the cheaters can access
and modify the device’s memory, run their own code inside the executable
and they can listen and alter messages that are sent from the device over the
network.
As the cheaters have a full access to the game and in the earlier chap-
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ters we have learned that most of the client-side cheat protection methods
are unreliable, we have decided to use a server-authoritative architecture to
protect against cheaters. But we still want to retain some of the features
that the client-side cheat protection methods provide, such as the ability to
play offline. Offline play is actually a very important for many games, but
especially for mobile games where the mobile networks can be unreliable at
times. The player might lose the network connection temporarily to a blind
spot while traveling, for example in a subway tunnel or inside a building.
Thus, it is very important for us to make the game playable even when there
is no network connection but only for a limited time. Because we have chosen
to use the server authoritative model, we need to design the architecture in a
way that is especially efficient in network performance. We want to minimize
the number of messages sent between the client and the server because con-
stant communication between the client and the server consumes the mobile
device’s battery faster as we have learned in the chapter 3.1.4. Also, having
fewer messages will reduce the bandwidth usage of the game. The downside
of having fewer messages is that the message payloads are bigger because we
need to send more data per message. This will have a negative impact to
the latency of the message when the network speed is limited. In the next
section we justify and present our design for the architecture of the game.
4.2 Design and architecture
The simplest solution would be to use a server authoritative model where
all the game logic is run on the server, but this would mean that the game
would require a constant connection between the client and the server. A
fully server authoritative model would prevent players from using any client-
side cheats, but it would also mean that offline play would not be possible.
A more suitable solution would be to use a mixed authority model where
one part of the game logic is client authoritative and the other part would
be server authoritative. In our example game, the single player mode would
be client authoritative and the multiplayer mode would be server authori-
tative. This would satisfy the requirement that the game must be playable
in a single player mode when there is no network connection because the
single player game logic is only run on the client. Also, it would reduce
the amount of traffic between the client and the server because when using
the client authoritative model, the client can synchronize the client’s game
state less frequently with the server.The client could synchronize the client
authoritative game state only before entering to the multiplayer mode. But
it would also mean that the client authoritative game state would vulnera-
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ble for client-side cheats as we have learned in the previous chapters. This
could have also a significant effect on the multiplayer if the player can achieve
things in the single player mode that are usable in the multiplayer mode and
thus gain an advantage against other players. The player could use cheats to
achieve more powerful weapons in the single player mode and then use these
weapons in the multiplayer mode against other players. This would have a
significant effect to the game balance and eventually it would lead to a bad
user experience for the other players. Also, splitting the game logic in two
parts would mean that the same game code must be implemented for both
the client authoritative model and the server authoritative model.
Because splitting the game logic to the client authoritative and the server
authoritative parts is not suitable for our game we need to find an alternative
solution that would work with the server authoritative model. Instead of
using a fully server authoritative model we decided to use a client optimistic
server authoritative model. It resembles the client-side prediction method
that was introduced in the chapter 3.2.3. The client-side prediction method
is used to reduce the latency between triggering and executing the action
when the it needs to be validated on the server. In the client optimistic
model, the client processes the action first on the client and then stores the
action so that it can then later be sent to the server. So, instead of sending
the action immediately to the server it is delayed until the client decides
otherwise. Finally, when the client sends the actions to the server in a single,
batched message the server processes the actions and updates the server’s
game state. After processing the actions, the server sends the new game
state to the client which then determines if the client’s game state is in sync
with the server’s game state.
Using the client optimistic server authoritative model, the game can be
played in an offline mode because the actions can be stored on the client and
it can send them to the server after the connection with the server is restored.
As the single player mode has no effect to other players, this approach allows
reducing the number of messages send to the server, because the actions can
be delayed and send to the server in a batch thus reducing the number of
messages sent to the server.
In order to make the client server optimistic server authoritative model
to work the client and the server must stay synchronized. This means that
the client’s game state must match to the server’s game state of the client.
To keep the game states synchronized between the client and the server, the
game logic needs to be deterministic. This means that the game logic on the
client and the server must always produce the same output when processing
the game actions. Otherwise they get out of sync and subsequent actions may
fail when processed. The client can calculate a checksum value of the client’s
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the user-interface that triggers a specific action. Once the controller receives
an action, it creates a command object that stores the triggered action and
its parameters. It also stores the timestamp value when the action was
triggered on the client using the internal clock of the game. The game clock
is always synchronized with the server at the beginning of each play session.
The timestamp value is later used on the server to determine if the player
tried to cheat by changing the device clock. There are two different types of
commands: ServerClient and ServerFirst. The type of the command depends
on the action that was triggered. Actions that only affect the player’s game
state and has no effect to other player’s game states are always marked as
ServerClient commands. This means that they don’t depend on the server’s
result and they can be immediately processed by the client’s game logic.
Actions that also have an effect to the other players are marked as ServerFirst
commands. The ServerFirst commands are always first processed on the
server and only after that on the client.
If the action is marked as a ServerClient command, then the action im-
mediately processed by the client’s game logic. After processing the action on
the client, it calculates a checksum value from the client’s game state. This
checksum value is stored to the command object. Later when the command
object is sent to the server the checksum value is used to determine if the
client- and the server game states are still matching after the action on the
client and the server are processed. In other words, we can use the check-
sum value to detect if the player tried to cheat on the client by changing the
game logic or modifying the game state. The checksum values should match
after processing the actions due to the deterministic game logic model. The
checksum value can be a simple numeric value or a small byte array that
is calculated from the game state. In our project, that adapts the client
optimistic model, uses a checksum value instead of comparing the full game
state to reduce the amount of data sent between the client and the server.
Next, the client stores the ServerClient command object to an array inside
the controller. The ServerClient command object is then later sent to the
server for validation and processing.
If the action is marked as a ServerFirst command, the action needs to be
executed first on the server and only after the server has validated and pro-
cessed the action the client can process the action. Before the ServerFirst
command can be executed on the server we need to execute the pending
ServerClient commands on the server. Otherwise the server’s game state
would not be in a sync with the client’s game state as the commands would
be processed in a wrong order. To prevent this, the client creates a command
batch message that is sent to the server. The command batch message con-
tains an array of ServerClient commands and a single ServerFirst command.
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The idea is that the server first executes all of the ServerClient commands
and only after that the ServerFirst command. So, when the client is pro-
cessing an action that is marked as a ServerFirst command, it adds all the
stored ServerClient commands that are pending for the server execution to
the command batch message along with the currently triggered action that
was marked as ServerFirst command. After creating the command batch
message, the client sends the message to the server which validates and pro-
cesses all the commands inside the command batch message. First, the server
executes all the ServerClient commands and if they were executed success-
fully without any errors it then executes the ServerFirst command. For each
command the server validates that the command action and its parameters
are valid. Also, the server checks that the timestamp value that is stored
to the command is valid. The timestamp value must be greater or equal to
the last command that was processed by the server and the timestamp value
must be less or equal to the current timestamp of the server’s internal clock.
Otherwise we suspect that the player tried to cheat the game clock and the
validation fails. After processing the command’s action, the server calculates
a checksum value from the player’s game state that is stored on the server.
If the action was marked as a ServerClient command, the server compares
the checksum value to the checksum value that was stored to the command
after the action was processed on the client. If the validation step succeeds
and the checksum values are matching, the server acknowledges the action
and saves the changes to the player’s game state. In this case the server
sends a result indicating that the commands were executed on the server
successfully. When the client receives the result that was successful it still
needs to process the ServerFirst command on the client and compare the
checksum values to see if the client’s game state is matching to the server’s
game state. If the checksum value is not matching on the client, the client
triggers a rollback procedure where it downloads the last valid game state
from the server. If the server result was successful,the pending ServerClient
commands, that were sent with the command batch message, are removed
from the controller. If the validation step failed or if the checksum values
are not matching on the server, we assume that the player tried to cheat
and reject the changes. If the changes are rejected, the server responds with
a result indicating that a command was rejected and that the client needs
to rollback to the last valid game state that is stored on the server. In the
figure 4.2 below, we have presented a flowchart of the implemented client
optimistic server authoritative model.
There are also cases where we want to send the pending ServerClient
commands to the server even if there is no ServerFirst command to execute.
In this case we send the command batch message to the server without the
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4.4 Summary
We aimed to create an architecture for a game that supports both single
player and multiplayer modes without compromising the protection against
cheaters and the presented client optimistic server authoritative model per-
forms these requirements excellently. The client optimistic server authorita-
tive model makes it possible to play the game in a single player mode even
when there is no network connection for a longer duration. Because the ac-
tions are stored and later sent to the server for validation and processing,
it prevents the cheaters from using most of the client-side cheat methods in
the single player mode. The server can force the player’s game state to be
overwritten or rolled back if the server detects mismatch in the client and the
server checksum values. Also, the client optimistic model allows the client
to combine multiple actions into a single message that is sent to the server
which reduces the number of messages exchanged between the client and the
server. This can significantly reduce the load on the server and increase the
amount of supported concurrent players.
There are also drawbacks in the client optimistic server authoritative
model when it is compared to the server only authoritative model where
all the game logic is run only on the server. Because the client optimistic
model requires that the client must be able to process the actions and run
the game logic on the client it exposes the game’s logic for the cheaters.
Because the client and the server game logic are deterministic the cheaters
can decompile the client’s executable and learn how the game logic functions.
The cheaters can use this information to predict how the game behaves in
different situations and thus gain an advantage in the game. To prevent
these kind of cheats the game client should use code obfuscation to make
it harder for cheaters to learn the client’s game logic. Another problem is
that the player’s game state must be fully available for the client in order to
being able run the game logic. In other words, the game state must be also
stored on the client instead of having it stored only on the server and having
only a partial game state stored on the client. The cheaters can expose
the information that is stored in the client’s local game state and use the
information to cheat in the game. For example, in a single player mode they
could determine if they should attack the AI opponent by first checking the
AI opponent’s power from the client’s local game state. Unfortunately, there
is no definite way to protect the client’s local game state against information
exposure cheats. The client could use methods presented in the chapter 2
to protect the critical game state data, but they don’t guarantee that the
cheaters wouldn’t be able expose the protected game state data.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and future work
This thesis has studied the different approaches how to prevent cheating in
video games and evaluated their usefulness, complexity and performance. We
have also focused on how these approaches can be used in the mobile games
where there are special restrictions and limitations. Our analysis of the client-
side protection methods shows that they provide only a limited protection
against different cheat methods. The memory protection methods provide an
effective way to protect against memory editing tools and they are also easy
to implement. But they have also a significant impact on the performance.
The constant encryption and decryption of the protected variables consumes
a lot of processor power. This means that only the most important variables
can be protected. Also, the encryption algorithms are usually fairly trivial in
order to reduce the impact on the game’s performance. This means that the
cheaters can crack the encryption algorithm after some time. Time cheating
causes serious problems for the games because it is very easy to carry out.
As our investigation shows that the player can cheat the time by simply
changing the system time without using any external tools. There is no
reliable way to detect the changes in the system time on the client-side. It is
even harder to detect time cheats that are using code injection to change the
behaviour of the timing functions in the game. Finally, the code obfuscation
provides an efficient way to strengthen the protection and to make it more
difficult for cheaters to use different reverse engineering techniques. The code
obfuscation can have a slight impact on the performance of the game, but it
doesn’t require any extra work to implement because the obfuscation process
is automatic. The downside of the code obfuscation is that it only makes the
reverse engineering process more difficult, but it doesn’t prevent it.
On the other hand, our studies show that the server-side protection meth-
ods provide a considerably better protection against the cheaters. The client-
server model provides a better protection against cheating by moving the
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game logic on the server. In the server authoritative model all the game
logic can be run only on the server thus making the client only to display
the current state of the game. This makes most of the client-side cheats inef-
fective because they can’t affect to the game logic that is run on the server.
The server can also validate the actions sent by the client in order to prevent
cheats that tamper the messages between the client and the server. From the
performance point of view the server-side protection methods have no effect
to the game’s performance. But they have a significant impact to the latency
and battery usage. Especially on the mobile devices the added latency from
the client-server communication is noticeable. Also, constant communication
between the client and the server can quickly drain the batter of the mobile
device. In the list below, we have identified several key points and limitations
of the different protection methods.
• The client-side protection methods provide only a limited protection against
the cheaters. With enough time the cheaters can either crack the pro-
tection methods or circumvent them.
• The client-side protection methods can have a significant impact to the
game’s performance, usually only part of the game can be protected
without having notable performance penalties.
• Detecting time cheating using client-side methods is unreliable. The only
way is to prevent time cheating reliable is to use a server synchronized
time.
• The code obfuscation makes it difficult to reverse engineer the cheat pro-
tection methods, but the code obfuscation alone doesn’t provide any
protection against cheating. The code obfuscation is used to make the
reverse engineering process too time consuming for the cheaters.
• Only the server-authoritative model can provide almost impenetrable pro-
tection against cheating. But it is still vulnerable for information ex-
posure and reflex augmentation cheats.
• The client-server communication increases the latency of the actions thus
the client needs to be able to compensate the added latency.
• Cheating in the mobile games is not different from the other games. The
same tools exist for both the mobile and the desktop platforms.
In the chapter 4 we presented our architecture for a mobile game that was
designed using the using the lessons learned from the other chapters. The
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architecture takes into account the limitations of the mobile devices while
still being almost cheat-proof. It even allows playing the game when there is
no network available while still being a fully server authoritative. Our initial
results have been promising and we haven’t found any significant flaws in the
design of the architecture that could not be resolved.
Overall, this thesis has been able to provide the analysis of the cheat
methods that are commonly used in the games. We have also identified
the problems of the client-side and the server-side cheat protection methods.
We have been also able to evaluate the performance and latency impact of
the different cheat protection methods. Also, we have pointed out how the
server-side cheat protection methods provide significantly better protection
than the client-side protection methods.
We have mostly concentrated on the commonly used cheat techniques
in this thesis. It may be further studied to analyze more different cheat
techniques. For example, bots are a major problem in many games and
especially in MMO games. The bots can have significant impact to the
game’s balance and even break the economy of the game. Furthermore, it
would be interesting to study if the statistical techniques of the machine
learning could be used in the cheat detection.
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